

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
EASTERN DIVISION

CELISA ANN WILLIAMS,	Ø	
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Plaintiff,	Ø	
	Ø	
vs.	Ø	No. 06-1009-T/An
	Ø	
DAVID WOOLFORK, et al.,	Ø	
	Ø	
Defendants.	Ø	
	Ø	

ORDER TO COMPLY WITH PLRA
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
ORDER CERTIFYING APPEAL NOT TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH
AND
NOTICE OF APPELLATE FILING FEE

Plaintiff Celisa Ann Williams, a prisoner at the Madison County Jail (“MCJ”), in Jackson, Tennessee, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, along with a motion for appointment of counsel. The Clerk shall record the defendants for this case as David Woolfork and Tom Rudder.

I. Assessment of Filing Fee

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b), all prisoners bringing a civil action must pay the full filing fee of \$250 required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The in forma pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) merely provides the prisoner

the opportunity to make a "downpayment" of a partial filing fee and pay the remainder in installments.

In this case, plaintiff has not properly completed and submitted both an in forma pauperis affidavit and a prison trust fund account statement showing:

- 1) the average monthly deposits, and
- 2) the average monthly balance

for the six months prior to submission of the complaint, and

- 3) the account balance when the complaint was submitted.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), it is ORDERED that the plaintiff cooperate fully with prison officials in carrying out this order. It is ORDERED that within thirty (30) days of the entry of this order the plaintiff properly complete and file both an in forma pauperis affidavit and a trust fund account statement showing the above amounts. It is further ORDERED that the trust fund officer at plaintiff's prison shall calculate a partial initial filing fee equal to twenty percent of the greater of the average balance in or deposits to the plaintiff's trust fund account for the six months immediately preceding the completion of the affidavit. When the account contains any funds, the trust fund officer shall collect them and pay them directly to the Clerk of Court. If the funds in plaintiff's account are insufficient to pay the full amount of the initial partial filing fee, the prison official is instructed to withdraw all of the funds in the plaintiff's account and forward them to the Clerk of Court. On each occasion that funds are subsequently credited to plaintiff's account the prison official shall

immediately withdraw those funds and forward them to the Clerk of Court, until the initial partial filing fee is paid in full.

It is further ORDERED that after the initial partial filing fee is fully paid, the trust fund officer shall withdraw from the plaintiff's account and pay to the Clerk of this Court monthly payments equal to twenty percent (20%) of all deposits credited to plaintiff's account during the preceding month, but only when the amount in the account exceeds \$10.00, until the entire \$250.00 filing fee is paid.

Each time that the trust fund officer makes a payment to the Court as required by this order, he shall print a copy of the prisoner's account statement showing all activity in the account since the last payment under this order and file it with the Clerk along with the payment.

All payments and account statements shall be sent to:

Clerk, United States District Court, Western District of Tennessee, 262 Federal Building, 111 S. Highland Ave., Jackson, TN 38301

and shall clearly identify plaintiff's name and the case number on the first page of this order.

If plaintiff is transferred to a different prison or released, he is ORDERED to notify the Court immediately of her change of address. If still confined she shall provide the officials at the new prison with a copy of this order.

If the plaintiff fails to abide by these or any other requirement of this order, the Court may impose appropriate sanctions, including a monetary fine, without any additional notice or hearing by the Court.

The Clerk shall mail a copy of this order to the prison official in charge of prison trust fund accounts at plaintiff's prison.

The obligation to pay this filing fee shall continue despite the immediate dismissal of this case. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The Clerk shall not issue process or serve any papers in this case.

II. Motion for Appointment of Counsel

A district court is vested with broad discretion in determining whether to appoint counsel for an indigent civil litigant. See Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 601, 604-05 (6th Cir. 1993). Notably, however, appointment of counsel in a civil case is not a constitutional right, and courts generally do not appoint counsel in a civil case absent a showing of "exceptional circumstances." Id. at 605-06. In determining whether an appointment is warranted, courts evaluate the type of case, the complexity of the factual and legal issues involved, and the ability of the litigant to represent himself. See id. at 606; Kilgo v. Ricks, 983 F.2d 189, 193 (11th Cir. 1993)("The key [to determining whether exceptional circumstances exist] is whether the pro se litigant needs help in presenting the essential merits of his or her position to the court. Where the facts and issues are simple, he or she usually will not need such help.") Appointment of counsel in a civil case is not appropriate when a litigant's claims are frivolous, or when the chances of success are extremely slim. See Lavado, 992 F.2d at 604-05; Maclin v. Freake, 650 F.2d 885, 887 (7th Cir. 1981)("[B]efore the court is justified in exercising its discretion in favor of appointment, it must first appear that the claim has some merit in fact and law.").

The Court concludes that an appointment of counsel is not warranted. As explained below, plaintiff's complaint is to be dismissed; therefore her motion for appointment of counsel is DENIED.

III. Analysis of Claims

Williams sues Madison County Sheriff David Woolfork and Jail Administrator Tom Rudder. Plaintiff alleges that she was ten weeks pregnant at the time of her arrest and had also been hospitalized for an automobile accident. She alleges that she began experiencing pain and symptoms of a miscarriage on November 3, 2005. Plaintiff states that she complained to unnamed Jail Officers on a daily basis but was not taken to her doctor or given pain medication. Plaintiff contends that she began bleeding and cramping on November 10, 2005, and informed unnamed Jail Nursing Staff of her symptoms. Plaintiff alleges that Jail Nursing Staff and Officers became irate. She further alleges that Officer Stow placed her in isolation for approximately three days, beginning on November 18, 2004. Williams alleges that, upon her release from the isolation, she told a Jail Trusty that she thought she had miscarried and she was transported for medical treatment.

The Sixth Circuit has held that 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) requires a federal court to dismiss without prejudice whenever a prisoner brings a prison conditions claim without demonstrating that she has exhausted her administrative remedies. Brown v. Toombs, 139 F.3d 1102 (6th Cir. 1998). This requirement places an affirmative burden on prisoners of pleading particular facts demonstrating the complete exhaustion of claims. Knuckles El v. Toombs, 215 F.3d 640, 642 (6th Cir. 2000).

In order to comply with the mandates of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a),

a prisoner must plead his claims with specificity and show that they have been exhausted by attaching a copy of the applicable administrative dispositions to the complaint or, in the absence of written documentation, describe with specificity the administrative proceeding and its outcome.

Knuckles El, 215 F.3d at 642; see also Baxter v. Rose, 305 F.3d 486 (6th Cir. 2002)(prisoner who fails to adequately allege exhaustion may not amend his complaint to avoid a sua sponte dismissal); Curry v. Scott, 249 F.3d 493, 503-04 (6th Cir. 2001) (no abuse of discretion for district court to dismiss for failure to exhaust when plaintiffs did not submit documents showing complete exhaustion of their claims or otherwise demonstrate exhaustion). Furthermore, § 1997(e) requires the prisoner to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing suit and, therefore, he cannot exhaust these remedies during the pendency of the action. Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d 641, 645 (6th Cir. 1999).

This complaint is fully within the scope of § 1997e. Plaintiff alleges that she “filed numerous grievance[sic] because of the treatment she received with not even a hearing be [sic] held. She does not allege what administrative remedies are available at the Jail and does not attach copies of any grievance filed.

Plaintiff was required to file a grievance for each incident which detailed the incident and named the party involved. The plaintiff has submitted no evidence that the enclosed grievances were actually filed. Furthermore, the Court has no way to determine that the grievances name these individual defendants, as required by Moorer v. Price, 83 Fed. Appx. 770, 772 (6th Cir. Dec. 9, 2003) (plaintiff did not exhaust claim against warden because his

grievance did not identify the warden or articulate any claim against her); Thomas v. Woolum, 337 F.3d 720, 733-34 (6th Cir. 2003); and Curry, 249 F.3d at 504.

Accordingly, the plaintiff has not satisfied her burden of demonstrating that she exhausted her administrative remedies before filing this complaint.¹ As plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies before filing this complaint, the Court dismisses the complaint in its entirety under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

IV. Appeal Issues

The next issue to be addressed is whether plaintiff should be allowed to appeal this decision in forma pauperis. Twenty-eight U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) provides that an appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies in writing that it is not taken in good faith. The good faith standard is an objective one. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962).

Under Brown v. Toombs an appellate court must dismiss a complaint if a prisoner has failed to comply with 1997e's exhaustion requirements. Accordingly, if a district court determines that a complaint must be dismissed as unexhausted, plaintiff would not yet be able to present an issue in good faith on appeal because that appeal would also be subject to immediate dismissal. Thus, the same considerations that lead the Court to dismiss this case

¹ An inmate can exhaust administrative remedies in two ways. She might file the grievance and then appeal it through all administrative levels made available by the particular institution or government agency. Alternatively, she might attempt in good faith to follow the procedure and demonstrate that the institution or agency has completely frustrated the procedure and rendered further exhaustion efforts futile. This complaint alleges neither method of exhaustion.

for failure to exhaust administrative remedies compel the conclusion that an appeal would be subject to immediate dismissal.

It is therefore CERTIFIED, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal in this matter by plaintiff is not taken in good faith, and plaintiff may not proceed on appeal in forma pauperis.

The final matter to be addressed is the assessment of a filing fee if plaintiff appeals the dismissal of this case. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has held that a certification that an appeal is not taken in good faith does not affect an indigent prisoner plaintiff's ability to take advantage of the installment procedures contained in § 1915(b). McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 610-11 (6th Cir. 1997). McGore sets out specific procedures for implementing the PLRA. Therefore, the plaintiff is instructed that if she wishes to take advantage of the installment procedures for paying the appellate filing fee, she must comply with the procedures set out in McGore and § 1915(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ **James D. Todd**
JAMES D. TODD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE